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The problem of merging multiple sources of information is central in many information process-
ing areas such as databases integrating problems, multiple criteria decision making, etc. To solve this
problem, two kinds of approaches have been proposed. The ﬁrst category of approaches merges the
diﬀerent bases into a unique consistent base, and the second category, such as argumentation,
accepts inconsistency and copes with it.
It is well known that priorities are crucial to solve conﬂicts. Recently, powerful approaches have
been proposed to merge multiple sources information where priorities are either explicitly or implic-
itly associated to information [L. Cholvy, Reasoning about merging information, Handbook of
Defeasible Reasoning and Uncertainty Management Systems, vol. 3, 1998, pp. 233–263; S. Kon-
ieczny, R. Pino Pe´rez, On the logic of merging, in: Proceedings of the 6th International Conference
on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR’98), Trento, 1998, pp. 488–498; J.
Lin, Integration of weighted knowledge bases, Artiﬁcial Intelligence 83 (1996) 363–378; J. Lin, A.
Mendelzon, Merging databases under constraints, International Journal of Cooperative Information
Systems 7(1) (1998) 55–76; N. Rescher, R. Manor, On inference from inconsistent premises, Theory
and Decision 1 (1970) 179–219; P.Z. Revesz, On the semantics of theory change: arbitration between
old and new information, in: 12th ACM SIGACT-SIGMOD-SIGART Symposium on Principles of
Databases, 1993, pp. 71–92; S. Benferhat, D. Dubois, S. Kaci, H. Prade, Possibilistic merging and0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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322 L. Amgoud, S. Kaci / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 45 (2007) 321–340distance-based fusion of propositional information, Annals of Mathematics and Artiﬁcial Intelli-
gence, 34(1–3) (2002) 217–252; S. Benferhat, D. Dubois, H. Prade, M. Williams, A practical
approach to fusing and revising prioritized belief bases, in: Proceedings of the 9th Portuguese Con-
ference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (EPIA’99), 1999, pp. 222–236; S. Kaci, Connaissances et Pre´fe´renc-
es: Repre´sentation et fusion en logique possibiliste, The`se de doctorat, Universite´ Paul Sabatier,
Toulouse, 2002]. In this paper, we present an argumentation framework for solving conﬂicts which
could be applied to conﬂicts arising between agents in a multi-agent system. We suppose that each
agent is represented by a knowledge base and that the diﬀerent agents are conﬂicting. We show that
the argumentation framework retrieves the results of the merging approaches. Moreover, an argu-
mentation-based approach palliates the limits, due to the drowning problem, of the merging operator
when information is pervaded with explicit priorities.
 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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In many areas such as cooperative information systems, multi-databases, multi-agents
reasoning systems, GroupWare, distributed expert systems, information comes from mul-
tiple sources. The multiplicity of sources providing information often makes that informa-
tion is contradictory. For example, in a distributed medical expert system, diﬀerent experts
often disagree on the diagnosis of patients’ diseases. In a multi-database system two com-
ponent databases may record the same data item but give it diﬀerent values because of
incomplete updates, system error, or diﬀerences in underlying semantics.
Two approaches to deal with contradictory information coming from multiple sources
are distinguished:
• The ﬁrst approach consists of merging these items of information and constructing a
consistent set of information which represents the result of merging [6,7,12,17–
20,24,26,9]. In other words, starting from diﬀerent bases B1, . . . ,Bn which are conﬂict-
ing, these works return a unique consistent base.
• The second approach consists of solving the conﬂicts without merging the bases. Argu-
mentation is one of the most promising of these approaches [15,2,1,10,22]. It is based on
the construction of arguments and counter-arguments (defeaters) and the selection of
the most acceptable of these arguments. Then inferences are drawn from acceptable
arguments.
Besides, the notion of priority plays a crucial role in the study of knowledge-based sys-
tems. When priorities attached to pieces of knowledge are available, the task of coping with
inconsistency is greatly simpliﬁed, since conﬂicts have a better chance to be resolved. Two
kinds of priorities can be distinguished: implicit priorities that are extracted from knowledge
bases, and explicit priorities that are speciﬁed outside the logical theory to which they apply.
Priorities have been considered in the two above approaches, and several priority-based
operators have been proposed for merging multiple sources of information. When infor-
mation is modelled in propositional logic, existing approaches [18–20,24,26] deﬁne implicit
priorities based on a distance, generally Hamming’s distance [13]. In [6,7,17], other merging
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are considered where prioritized information are encoded by means of weighted proposi-
tional formulas.
The aim of this paper is to establish the relationship between argumentation theory and
information merging when priorities are either implicitly or explicitly expressed. Inspired
by the work presented in [2], we present a preference-based argumentation framework for
reasoning with conﬂicting knowledge bases where each base could be part of a separate
agent. This framework uses preference relations between arguments in order to determine
the acceptable ones. We show that by selecting an appropriate preference relation between
arguments, the preference-based argumentation framework can be used to merging con-
ﬂicting bases in the sense that it recovers the results of fusion operators deﬁned in
[11,18–20,24,25,6,7].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After presenting the language in
the next section, Section 3 recalls the merging process when information is based on impli-
cit or explicit priorities. In Section 4, a general preference-based argumentation framework
is presented. Section 5 ﬁrst recalls the connection between argumentation framework and
merging approaches [3] based on implicit priorities presented in Section 3.1. Then it pre-
sents the result of the present paper which consists of connecting argumentation frame-
work to merging approaches based on explicit priorities presented in Section 3.2.
Section 6 is devoted to concluding remarks.
2. Logical language
Let us consider a propositional language L over a ﬁnite alphabet P of atoms. X
denotes the set of all the interpretations. Logical equivalence is denoted by  and classical
conjunction and disjunction are respectively denoted by ^ and _. ‘ denotes classical infer-
ence. The notation x  / means that the interpretation x is a model of (or satisﬁes) the
formula /. Mod(K) denotes the set of models of a propositional formulas base K.
A preference relation on a setM  X is a (total or partial) preorder such that 8x;x0 2M,
x  x 0 stands for x is at least as preferred as x 0.  denotes the strict order associated to .
Preferred (called also minimal) elements ofMw.r.t., denoted minðM;Þ, are those which
are not dominated by any other element ofM. Formally, we write
minðM;Þ ¼ fx : x 2M and 9=x0 2M s:t: x0  xg:3. Merging multiple sources information
We present in this section some merging operators deﬁned on the basis of priorities. As
said before, two kinds of priorities can be distinguished: implicit priorities which are
extracted from a knowledge base, and explicit priorities which are given in terms of weights
associated to each piece of information in a knowledge base, as it is the case with possibi-
listic logic bases, or given in terms of a total or partial pre-order on a knowledge base.
3.1. Merging propositional information: use of implicit priorities
Let E = {K1, . . . ,Kn} be a set of n propositional bases to be merged. Merge(E) will
denote the result of merging the bases of E. In [18–20,26,27] implicit priorities are
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The three basic steps followed for deﬁning this distance-based merging are:
(1) Rank-order the set of interpretations X w.r.t each propositional base Ki by comput-
ing a local distance, denoted d(x,Ki), between x and each Ki in E. The local distance
is based on Hamming’s distance [13]. The distance between an interpretation x and a
propositional base Ki is the number of atoms on which this interpretation diﬀers
from some model of the propositional base. Formally, d(x,Ki) = min{dist(x,x 0)
jx 0 2Mod(Ki)} where dist(x,x 0) is the number of atoms whose valuations diﬀer
in the two interpretations.Table 1
Local d
x
x0
x1
x2
x3Example 1. Let us consider the three following bases: K1 = {a}, K2 = {a! b} and
K3 ¼ f:bg. X = {x0,x1,x2,x3} where x0 ¼ :a:b, x1 ¼ :ab, x2 ¼ a:b and
x3 = ab. Table 1 gives local distances between the interpretations and the bases.Rank-order the set of interpretations X w.r.t all the propositional bases. This leads to
the overall distance obtained from the aggregation of local distances using a merging(2)
operator denoted D. The resulting distance is denoted dD(x,E). On the basis of the
global distance, an ordering relation D between the interpretations is deﬁned as
follows:
xDx0 iff dDðx;EÞ 6 dDðx0;EÞ:
Several methods have been proposed in order to aggregate the local distances
d(w,Ki) according to whether the bases have the same weight or not. In particular
the following operators have been proposed:
• The sum operator [20], denoted SUM, deﬁned bydSUMðx;EÞ ¼
Xn
i¼1
dðx;KiÞ:
This operator follows the point of view of the majority of bases [20].
• The weighted sum operator [19], denotedWS, deﬁned bydWSðx;EÞ ¼
Xn
i¼1
dðx;KiÞ  ai;
where ai is a positive integer representing the weight associated with the base Ki.
• The max operator [26,27], denoted MAX, deﬁned bydMAXðx;EÞ ¼ maxfdðx;KiÞ j i ¼ 1; . . . ; ng:istances
d(x,K1) d(x,K2) d(x,K3)
1 0 0
1 0 1
0 1 0
0 0 1
(3)
Table
Global
x
x0
x1
x2
x3
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Example 2 (continued). Table 2 gives the global distances w.r.t. the merging
operators given above. Let a1 = a3 = 1 and a2 = 3 be the weights associated to the
bases forWS operator.
Lastly the result of merging MergeD(E) is deﬁned by being such that its models are
minimal with respect to D, namelyModðMergeDðEÞÞ ¼ minðX;DÞ:Example 3 (continued). Minimal models are
(1) ModðMergeSUMðEÞÞ ¼ fx0;x2;x3g,
(2) ModðMergeWSðEÞÞ ¼ fx0;x3g,
(3) ModðMergeMAXðEÞÞ ¼ >.3.2. Merging prioritized information in possibilistic logic
Before presenting merging approaches when explicit priorities are used, let us give nec-
essary background on possibilistic logic, an appropriate logic for modeling such priorities.
Prioritized information is represented in possibilistic logic at both semantic and syntac-
tic levels. At the semantic level, possibilistic logic is based on the notion of a possibility
distribution [28], denoted by p, which is a mapping from X to [0,1] representing the avail-
able information. p(x) represents the degree of compatibility of the interpretation x with
the available beliefs about the real world if we are representing uncertain pieces of know-
ledge (or the degree of satisfaction of reaching a state x if we are modeling preferences).
By convention, p(x) = 1 means that it is totally possible for x to be the real world (or that
x is fully satisfactory), 1 > p(x) > 0 means that x is only somewhat possible (or satisfac-
tory), while p(x) = 0 means that x is certainly not the real world (or not satisfactory at
all). Associated with a possibility distribution p is the necessity degree of any formula
/ : Nð/Þ ¼ 1Pð:/Þ which evaluates to what extent / is entailed by the available beliefs,
and deﬁned from the consistency degree of a formula / w.r.t. the available information,
P(/) = max{p(x) jx  X and x  /}.
Note that the mapping N reverses the scale on which p is ranging, and that N(/) = 1
means that / is a totally certain piece of knowledge or a compulsory goal, while N(/) =
0 expresses the complete lack of knowledge or of priority about /, but does not mean that2
distances
dSUMðx;EÞ dWSðx;EÞ dMAXðx;EÞ
1 1 1
2 2 1
1 3 1
1 1 1
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existing one in classical logic, where a formula is entailed from a set of classical formulas
if and only if its negation is consistent with this set.
At the syntactic level, prioritized items of information are represented by means of a
possibilistic knowledge base (or a possibilistic base for short) which is a set of weighted for-
mulas of the form B = {(/i,ai) j i = 1, . . . ,n}, where /i is a propositional formula and ai
belongs to a totally ordered scale such as the unit interval [0,1]. The pair (/i,ai) means that
the certainty (or priority) degree of /i is at least equal to ai(N(/i)P ai). We denote by B*
the propositional base associated with B obtained from B by forgetting the weights of for-
mulas. A possibilistic base B is consistent if and only if its associated propositional base B*
is consistent.
Given a possibilistic base B, we can generate a unique possibility distribution, denoted
by pB, such that all the interpretations satisfying all the formulas in B will have the highest
possibility degree, namely 1, and the other interpretations will be ranked w.r.t. the highest
formula that they falsify, namely we get [14].
Deﬁnition 1. "x 2 X,
pBðxÞ ¼
1 if 8ð/i; aiÞ 2 B; x  /i;
1maxfaijð/i; aiÞ 2 B and x2/ig otherwise:
(Example 4. Let B ¼ fð:p _ :q; :7Þ; ðp; :6Þg be a knowledge base. Its associated possibility
distribution is: pBðp:qÞ ¼ 1; pBð:p:qÞ ¼ pBð:pqÞ ¼ :4 and pB(pq) = .3.
The interpretation p:q is the most preferred since it satisﬁes all the formulas in B. The
interpretations :p:q and :pq are more preferred than pq since the highest formula
falsiﬁed by :p:q and :pq (i.e., (p,.6)) is less certain (or less prioritized) than the highest
formula falsiﬁed by pq (i.e., ð:p _ :q; :7Þ).
In the following, we give some deﬁnitions useful for the rest of the paper [7]:
Deﬁnition 2 (Equivalence). Let B1 and B2 be two possibilistic bases. B1 and B2 are said to
be equivalent iff pB1 ¼ pB2 .Deﬁnition 3 (a-cut and strict a-cut). Let B be a possibilistic knowledge base, and a 2 [0,1].
We call the a-cut (resp. strict a-cut) of B, denoted by BPa (resp. B>a), the set of proposi-
tional formulas in B having a certainty degree at least equal to a (resp. strictly greater
than a).Deﬁnition 4 (Inconsistency degree). The inconsistency degree of a possibilistic base B is
IncðBÞ ¼ maxfaijBPai is inconsistentg
with Inc(B) = 0 when B* is consistent.Deﬁnition 5 (Subsumption). Let (/,a) be a formula in B. (/,a) is said to be subsumed in
B if
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and (/,a) is said to be strictly subsumed in B if B>a ‘ /.
Subsumed formulas are in some sense redundant formulas as it is shown by the follow-
ing lemma [7]:
Lemma 1. Let (/, a) be a subsumed formula in B. Then B and B 0 = B  {(/, a)} are
equivalent.
Lastly, weights are propagated out in the inference process in the following way:
Deﬁnition 6 (Plausible inference). Let B be a possibilistic base. The formula / is a
plausible consequence of B iff
B>IncðBÞ ‘ /:Deﬁnition 7 (Possibilistic inference). Let B be a possibilistic base. The formula (/,a) is a
possibilistic consequence of B, denoted B ‘p (/,a), iff
• B>Inc(B) ‘ /,
• a > Inc(B) and "b > a, B>b 0 /.
Now that we have given necessary background on possibilistic logic, we recall the merg-
ing process of information provided with explicit priorities encoded in that framework. It
is a two step process
(1) From a set of possibilistic bases,1 computing a new possibilistic base, called the
aggregated base, which is generally inconsistent [7].
(2) Inferring conclusions from the new base.
A possibilistic merging operator, denoted by 	, is a function from [0,1]n to [0,1]. 	 is
used to aggregate the certainty degrees associated with pieces of information provided by
diﬀerent sources. Formally, let B ¼ fB1; . . . ;Bng be a set of n (possibly inconsistent) pos-
sibilistic bases. The result of merging the bases of B using 	, denoted by B	, is deﬁned as
follows [6]:
Deﬁnition 8 (Aggregated base). Let B ¼ fB1; . . . ;Bng be a set of possibilistic bases and 	
a merging operator. The result of merging B with 	 is deﬁned by
B	 ¼ fðDj;	ðx1; . . . ; xnÞÞ j j ¼ 1; . . . ; ng;
where Dj are disjunctions of size j among formulas taken from different Bi’s (i = 1, . . . ,n)
and xi is either equal to ai or to 0 depending respectively on whether /i belongs toDj or not.
Two properties for 	 are assumed in this deﬁnition [8,7]1 These bases may be individually inconsistent.
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(2) If aiP bi for all i = 1, . . . ,n then 	(a1, . . . ,an)P 	(b1, . . . ,bn).
The ﬁrst property says that if a formula does not explicitly appear in any base, then it
should not appear explicitly in the result of merging. The second property is simply the
unanimity property (called also monotonicity property) which means that if all the sources
say that a formula / is more plausible than (or preferred to) another formula w, then the
result of merging should conﬁrm this preference.
Example 5. Let B1 ¼ fð/ _ w; :9Þ; ð:/; :8Þ; ðn; :1Þg and B2 ¼ fð:w; :7Þ; ð/; :6Þg. Let 	 be
the probabilistic sum deﬁned by 	(a,b) = a + b  a * b. Following Deﬁnition 8, we get:
B	 ¼ fð/ _ w; :9Þ; ð:/; :8Þ; ðn; :1Þg [ fð:w; :7Þ; ð/; :6Þg [ fð/ _ w; :96Þ; ð:/ _ :w; :94Þ;
ðn _ :w; :73Þ; ðn _ /; :64Þg which is equivalent to fð/ _ w; :96Þ; ð:/ _ :w; :94Þ;
ð:/; :8Þ; ðn _ :w; :73Þ; ð:w; :7Þ; ðn _ /; :64Þ; ð/; :6Þ; ðn; :1Þg.
Lemma 2 gives a rewriting of B	 given in Deﬁnition 8 which will be useful in the rest of
the paper, but ﬁrst let us give the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 9 (Existential consequence). Let B be a possibilistic base. The formula (/,a) is
an existential consequence of B, denoted by B  (/,a), iff
• $B 0  B s.t. B 0 ‘p (/,a),
• B 0 is consistent,
• a = min{ai j (/i,ai) 2 B 0},
• B 0 is a minimal for set inclusion,
• 9=B00  B satisfying the above conditions with B00 ‘p (/,b) and b > a.This deﬁnition focuses on the subbases containing the most prioritized formulas.
Example 6. Let B ¼ fð/ _ w; :9Þ; ð:/; :7Þ; ðn _ w; :6Þ; ð:n; :5Þg. Then B  (/ _ w,.9),
B ð:/; :7Þ and B  (w, .7) however B  ð:w; 0Þ.Lemma 2. Let B	 be the result of merging B1, . . . ,Bn with 	. Then, B	 is equivalent to
fð/;	ða1; . . . ; anÞÞ j / 2L and Bi ð/; aiÞg:
Now that the base B	 is deﬁned, we are ready to deﬁne the result of merging. This cor-
responds to the possibilistic consequences of B	. Formally:
Deﬁnition 10 (Result of merging). Let B	 be the result of merging n possibilistic bases
B1, . . . ,Bn using a possibilistic merging operator 	. The result of merging is
T ¼ fð/i; aiÞ j B	 ‘p ð/i; aiÞg:Example 7. Let us consider again the base B	 obtained in Example 5. We have
B	 ¼ f/ _ w; :96Þ; ð:/ _ :w; :94Þ; ð:/; :8Þ; ðn _ :w; :73Þ; ð:w; :7Þ; ðn _ /; :64Þ; ð/; :6Þ;
(n,.1)}. Then T is equivalent to fð/ _ w; :96Þ; ð:/ _ :w; :94Þ; ð:/; :8Þ; ðw; :8Þ; ðn; :73Þg.
Here T is the minimal result of merging; we did not give subsumed formulas, for e.g.
ð:/ _ w; aÞ with a 6 .8.
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Argumentation is a reasoning model based on the construction and the comparison of
arguments. Argumentation frameworks have been developed for decision making under
uncertainty [4], and others [1,21] for handling inconsistency in knowledge bases where
each conclusion is justiﬁed by arguments. Arguments represent the reasons to believe in
a fact. An argumentation process follows the ﬁve following steps:
(1) Constructing arguments (in favor of/against a ‘‘statement’’) from bases.
(2) Deﬁning the strengths of those arguments.
(3) Determining the diﬀerent conﬂicts between the arguments.
(4) Evaluating the acceptability of the diﬀerent arguments.
(5) Concluding or deﬁning the justiﬁed conclusions.
Indeed, argumentation systems are built around an underlying logical languageL and
an associated notion of logical consequence, deﬁning the notion of argument. The argu-
ment construction is a monotonic process: new knowledge cannot rule out an argument
but only gives rise to new arguments which may interact with the ﬁrst argument. Since
the knowledge bases may be inconsistent, the arguments may be conﬂicting too. Conse-
quently, it is important to determine among all the available arguments, the ones which
will be justiﬁed. In what follows, we present the general argumentation framework pro-
posed in [2] which is an extension of the famous framework presented by Dung in [15].
Deﬁnition 11 (Argumentation framework). An argumentation framework (AF) is a triple
hA;R;i.A is a set of arguments, R is a binary relation representing defeat relationship
between arguments.  is a (partial or complete) pre-order onAA.  denotes the strict
ordering associated with .
Note that diﬀerent deﬁnitions ofA,R and give birth to diﬀerent argumentation systems.
In the above deﬁnition, an argument is an abstract entity whose structure and origin are
not known. Its role is only determined by its relation to other arguments via the defeat
relation.
The preference order between arguments makes it possible to distinguish diﬀerent types
of relations between arguments:
Deﬁnition 12. Let A and B be two arguments of A.
• B attacks A iff B R A and it is not the case that A  B.
• If B R A, then A defends itself against B iff A  B.
• A set of arguments S defends A if there is some argument in S which attacks every
argument B where B attacks A.Since arguments are conﬂicting, it is important to deﬁne the acceptable ones (i.e. the
‘‘good’’ ones). Inspired by Dung’s work [15], several diﬀerent semantics for the notion
of acceptability have been proposed in [2]. In what follows, we are interested in two kinds
of extensions: grounded extension and stable extensions. These two notions are based on a
coherence requirement deﬁned as follows:
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there does not exist A,B 2 S such that A R B and not(B  A).
The grounded extension is composed of arguments which are not defeated, arguments
which are defeated but preferred to their defeaters and lastly arguments which are defeated
but defended by acceptable arguments.
Deﬁnition 14 (Grounded extension). Let S be a conﬂict-free set of arguments, and let
F : 2A 7!2A be a function such that FðSÞ ¼ fA j S defends Ag.
The grounded extension of an argumentation framework hA;R;i is
S ¼
[
FiP0ð;Þ ¼ CR; [
[
FiP1ðCR;Þ
h i
:
CR; gathers all non-defeated arguments and arguments defending themselves against all
their defeaters.Deﬁnition 15 (Stable extension). Let hA;R;i be an (AF). A conﬂict-free set of argu-
ments S is a stable extension iff S is a ﬁxed point of a function G : 2A  2A such that
GðSÞ = {A 2A j 9=B 2 S such that B R A and not(A  B)}.
Let SE ¼ fS1; . . . ; Sng be the set of stable extensions of AF.
Note that an argumentation framework has at most one grounded extension, whereas it
may have several stable extensions.
5. Relating information merging with argumentation
Our aim in this section is to highlight the relationship between the two approaches to
solve conﬂicts described in the previous sections, namely merging multiple sources infor-
mation (with implicit or explicit priorities) and argumentation framework.
It has been shown in [3] that when information is modelled in propositional logic and
implicit priorities are assumed, merging approaches [18–20] are recovered in standard
argumentation framework. We show in this paper that a particular argumentation frame-
work is needed to recover merging approaches when information is pervaded with explicit
priorities [6,7,17].
In order to recover the results of the diﬀerent merging operators within an argumenta-
tion framework, one needs to specify the basic argumentation framework presented in Sec-
tion 4, in particular one needs to give the deﬁnitions of an argument, of the defeasibility
relation between arguments, and ﬁnally of the preference relation between arguments.
There are several deﬁnitions of argument and defeat among arguments. For our pur-
pose, we will use the deﬁnitions proposed in [16]. Indeed, these deﬁnitions will be used
for capturing the results of the diﬀerent merging operators deﬁned in Section 3. However,
things are diﬀerent with the third parameter of an argumentation framework, namely the
preference relation between arguments. We will show that a speciﬁc relation is needed for
recovering each merging operator.
Let K be a propositional knowledge base. From K diﬀerent arguments may be con-
structed. In what follows, we will denote byAðKÞ the set of all arguments that can be built
from a given base K as follows.
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(1) h is a formula of the language L,
(2) H  K,
(3) H is consistent,
(4) H ‘ h,
(5) H is minimal (no strict subset of H satisﬁes 1, 2, 3, 4).
H is called the support and h the conclusion of the argument.
Let R be a set of arguments. Supp(R) is a function which returns the union of the sup-
ports of all the elements of R.
The defeat relation which will be used throughout the paper is the following:
Deﬁnition 17 (Attack). Let hH,hi and hH 0,h 0i be two arguments of AðKÞ. hH,hi
undercuts hH 0,h 0i iff for some k 2 H 0, h  :k. An argument is undercut if there exists at
least one argument against one element of its support.5.1. The ﬂat case
We recall in this section how to capture the results of merging approaches described in
Section 3.1, proposed in [3]. For this purpose, an argument hH,hi takes its support from
K1 [ 
 
 
 [ Kn i.e., H  K1 [ 
 
 
 [ Kn. Recall that E = {K1, . . . ,Kn} is the set of bases to be
merged with a merging operator D. We say that hH,hi is constructed from E.
Then the basic idea is to associate to the support of each argument a force. This last
corresponds to the minimal distance between the support of the argument and the
diﬀerent bases Ki. The following deﬁnes formally the distance between a support and a
base.
Deﬁnition 18 (Distance Support-Base). Let hH,hi be an argument and K be a proposi-
tional base. The distance between the support H and K is computed as follows:
dðH ;KÞ ¼ minfdistðx;x0Þ j x  H and x0  Kg:Example 8. Let us consider again the bases K1 = {a}, K2 = {a! b} and K3 ¼ f:bg given
in Example 1. H = {a,a! b}, H 0 ¼ f:bg are two subsets of K1 [ K2 [ K3.
• d(H,K1) = d(H,K2) = 0, d(H,K3) = 1,
• d(H 0,K1) = 0, d(H 0,K2) = 0, d(H 0,K3) = 0.To capture the results of the distance-based merging operator D, we deﬁne the force of a
support as follows:
Deﬁnition 19. Let E = {K1, . . . ,Kn} and hH,hi be an argument constructed from E.ForceðHÞ ¼ DðdðH ;K1Þ; . . . ; dðH ;KnÞÞ:
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force of a support makes it possible to deﬁne a preference relation between arguments.Deﬁnition 20 (Preference relation). Let hH,hi and hH 0,h 0i be two arguments constructed
from E. hH,hi is preferred to hH 0,h 0i, denoted hH,hi D hH 0,h 0i iff Force(H) < Force(H 0).
In the following, AðEÞ will denote the set of arguments constructed from E.
Proposition 1. Let S1, . . . ,Sn be the stable extensions of the argumentation framework
hAðEÞ;Undercut;Di. Then, Mod(Supp(S1)) [ 
 
 
 [Mod(Supp(Sn)) is the set of models
obtained by the merging operator D.Example 9 (continued). Let us consider the framework hAðEÞ;Undercut;Di where:
AðEÞ ¼ fA1 ¼ hfag; ai;A2 ¼ hfa! bg; a! bi;A3 ¼ hf:bg;:bi;A4 ¼ hfa; a! bg; bi;A5 ¼
hf:b; a! bg;:ai;A6 ¼ hfa;:bg;:ða! bÞig.
Undercut = {(A4,A3), (A4, A5), (A4,A6), (A5,A4), (A5,A1), (A5,A6), (A6,A5), (A6,A4),
(A6,A2)}. Table 3 gives the distance between each argument and the bases K1, K2, K3 and
also the force of each argument following different merging operators.
Let us consider the SUM operator. Three stable extensions can be computed:
S1 = {A2,A3,A5}, S2 = {A1,A2,A4} and S3 = {A1,A3,A6}.
We have
• ModðSuppðS1ÞÞ ¼Modðf:b; a! bgÞ ¼ f:a;:bg ¼ fx3g,
• Mod(Supp(S2)) = Mod({a,a! b}) = {a,b} = {x0},
• ModðSuppðS3ÞÞ ¼Modðfa;:bgÞ ¼ fa;:bg ¼ fx1g.
This corresponds to the result of distance-based merging where we get
ModðMergeSUMðEÞÞ ¼ fx0;x1;x3g.5.2. The prioritized case
Our aim in this section is to show that argumentation framework can also recover
merging approaches when information is pervaded with explicit priorities encoded in pos-
sibilistic logic framework.Table 3
Distance and force of the arguments
Argument d(H,K1) d(H,K2) d(H,K3) ForceSUMðHÞ ForceWSðHÞ ForceMAXðHÞ
A1 0 0 0 0 0 0
A2 0 0 0 0 0 0
A3 0 0 0 0 0 0
A4 0 0 1 1 1 1
A5 1 0 0 1 1 1
A6 0 1 0 1 3 1
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denote the set of all disjunctions of diﬀerent size that can be formed from formulas of the n
bases. Conj will denote the set of formulas of B1, . . . ,Bn with possibly new weights.
Weights of formulas in Disj and Conj are aggregated using an operator . For instance,
if the formula (/,a) is in B1 and (w,b) is in B2, then the formula (/ _ w, (a,b)) will be
in Disj and the formulas (/, (a, 0)) and (w, (0,b)) will be in Conj, with (x,y) is for
example max(x,y) or min(x,y), etc. In what follows, B ¼ Conj [ Disj. In fact, it can be
shown that if the aggregation operator  is exactly the operator 	, then the two bases
B and B	 are equivalent.
Proposition 2. Let B1, . . . ,Bn be different possibilistic bases. If  = 	, then the bases B and
B	 are equivalent.
All the proofs are given in Appendix A.
Let us now start by deﬁning the notion of argument. An argument has a deductive form
and takes the form of an explanation. Each argument is constructed from formulas of
B1, . . . ,Bn and disjunctions between formulas of these bases.
An argument in this subsection takes its support from B i.e., let hH,hi be an argument
constructed from B then H  B. Note that it is not necessary to construct the bases Disj
and Conj in order to deﬁne the arguments. Fragments of these bases are constructed only
when needed i.e., when building arguments.
When explicit priorities are given between the beliefs, such as certainty degrees, a pref-
erence relation between arguments may be deﬁned such that the arguments using more
certain beliefs are found stronger than arguments using less certain beliefs. The force of
an argument corresponds to the certainty degree of the less entrenched belief involved
in the argument.
Deﬁnition 21 (Force of an argument). Let A = hH,hi be an argument. The force of A,
denoted by Force(A), is
ForceðAÞ ¼ minfai j /i 2 H and ð/i; aiÞ 2 Bg:
The following proposition shows that the force of an argument can be computed from
B without computing explicitly the base Disj.Proposition 3. Let B1, . . . ,Bn be n possibilistic bases. Let A = hH,/i be an argument in
AðBÞ. It holds that
ForceðAÞ ¼ minf	ðaj1; . . . ; ajnÞ j /j 2 H ;Bi  ð/j; ajiÞg:Example 10. Let us compute an argument for / _ w from B	. We get A1 = h{/ _ w},/
_ wi and A2 = h{/}, s/ _ wi.
A1 is stronger than A2 since Force(A1) = .96 whereas Force(A2) = .6.
Now B1  (/ _ w, .9) and B2  (/ _ w, .6). Then, Force(A1) = min{ 	(.9, .6)} = .96.
Similarly to the ﬂat case, the forces of an argument makes it possible to compare pairs
of arguments as follows:
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preferred to A 0, denoted by A 	 A 0, iff Force(A) > Force(A 0).Example 11. Let us consider again the possibilistic base given in Example 6:
B ¼ fð/ _ w; :9Þ; ð:/; :7Þ; ðn _ w; :6Þ; ð:n; :5Þg. There are two arguments in favor of w
• A1 ¼ hf/ _ w;:/g;wi,
• A2 ¼ hfn _ w;:ng;wi.
A1 is preferred to A2 since Force(A1) = .7 whereas Force(A2) = .5.
We can show easily that any plausible consequence of a given possibilistic base B is sup-
ported by an acceptable argument, if we consider only the argumentsAðBÞ built from that
base B.
Proposition 4. Let B be a possibilistic base, and let hAðBÞ;Undercut;	i be an
argumentation framework and S its set of acceptable arguments.
If (/, a) is a plausible consequence of B, then 9A ¼ hH ;/i 2S.
Another interesting result states that any possibilistic consequence (/,a) of a given pos-
sibilistic base Bi is supported by an acceptable argument A whose force is equal to a.
Moreover, A is the strongest argument w.r.t  in favor of /. This means that the degree
a of a possibilistic consequence / corresponds to the force of the best argument in favor
of /.
Proposition 5. Let B be a possibilistic base, and let hAðBÞ;Undercut;	i be an
argumentation framework and S its set of acceptable arguments.
If (/, a) is a possibilistic consequence of B, then 9A ¼ hH ;/i 2S with Force(A) = a, and
8A0 ¼ hH 0;/i 2S;A	A0.
An important concept in possibilistic logic is that of inconsistency degree of a possibi-
listic base B. In what follows, we will show that the inconsistency degree can be computed
from the forces of the conﬂicting arguments as follows:
Proposition 6. Let B be a possibilistic base, and let hAðBÞ;Undercut;	i be an
argumentation framework.
IncðBÞ ¼ maxfminðForceðAiÞ;ForceðAjÞÞjAi;Aj 2AðBÞ and Ai Undercuts Ajg:Example 12. Let us consider the base B	 constructed in Example 5: B	 ¼ fð/ _ w; :96Þ,
ð:/ _ :w; :94Þ, ð:/; :8Þ, ðn _ :w; :73Þ, ð:w; :7Þ, (n _ /, .64), (/, .6), (n, .1)}.
Table 4 summarizes the diﬀerent arguments which can be constructed from B	 and
their force. As we mentioned before, we only focus on the best arguments (i.e., having the
highest force) in favor of formulas. For example, there is an argument A = h{/}, / _ wi,
with a force equal to .6, in favor of / _ w however it is not considered since there is
another argument A1 in favor of / _ w with a higher force. We have Undercut =
{(A6,A3), (A6,A4), (A7,A5), (A7,A6), (A6,A7)}.
Table 4
The force of arguments in possibilistic logic framework
Argument Force
A1 = h{/ _ w},/ _ wi .96
A2 ¼ hf:/ _ :wg;:/ _ :wi .94
A3 ¼ hf:/g;:/i .8
A4 ¼ hfn _ :w;:/;/ _ wg; ni .73
A5 ¼ hf:wg;:wi .7
A6 ¼ hf/ _ w;:wg;/i .7
A7 ¼ hf:/;/ _ wg;wi .8
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checked that the inconsistency degree of B	 is .7.
Indeed we have the following result:
Proposition 7. Let B be a possibilistic base.
(1) A formula / is a plausible consequence of B iff $A = hH,/i in AðBÞ s.t.
Force(A) > Inc(B).
(2) A formula (/, a) is a possibilistic consequence of B iff $A = hH,/i in AðBÞ s.t. For-
ce(A) > Inc(B), Force(A) = a and 8A0 ¼ hH ;/i 2AðBÞ s.t. Force(A) > Inc(B), we
have Force(A)P Force(A 0).Example 13. Let us consider the diﬀerent arguments of Example 12. Only the arguments
having a weight strictly greater than .7 are considered. Namely A1, A2, A3, A4 and A7.
Thus, the plausible consequences of B	 are / _ w; :/ _ :w; :/; n and w (and their con-
sequences). The possibilistic consequences of B	 are ð/ _ w; :96Þ; ð:/ _ :w; :94Þ,
ð:/; :8Þ; ðn; :73Þ and (w, .8) (and their consequences).
The following theorem ends this section and shows that the result of merging in possi-
bilistic logic framework is captured in argumentation framework.
Theorem 1. Let B1, . . . ,Bn different possibilistic bases and 	 be a possibilistic merging
operator. Let hA;Undercut;	i be an argumentation framework constructed from B. If
 = 	 then the following result holds:
T  SuppðSÞ;
where T is given in Definition 10.
The above result shows that an argumentation framework is ‘‘stronger’’ than the merg-
ing operator deﬁned in Section 3.2 in the sense that it may return more results. The reason
is that possibilistic logic suﬀers from the so-called drowning problem [5]. A drowning prob-
lem means that some information that is not responsible of conﬂicts may be ignored. More
precisely, formulas at the level and below the inconsistency degree are ignored.
Example 14. Let us consider again the bases B1 and B2 given in Example 5. Let 	 be the
max operator. Then, B	 ¼ B1 [ B2 ¼ fð/ _ w; :9Þ; ð:/; :8Þ; ð:w; :7Þ; ð/; :6Þ; ðn; :1Þg.
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while the argumentation-based inference gives f/ _ w;:/;w; ng.6. Conclusion
We presented in this paper an argumentation-based framework for resolving conﬂicts
between knowledge bases in a prioritized case where priorities are represented in possibi-
listic logic framework. The proposed approach is diﬀerent from the classical way used in
the literature to deal with conﬂicting multiple sources information.
The classical existing approaches consist of ﬁrst merging individual bases into a new
base from which conclusions are drawn. The new base is composed of the most prioritized
consistent formulas. The drawback of this approach is that it may ignore formulas that are
not responsible for the conﬂicts.
The argumentation-based approach proposed here builds arguments from the separate
bases, evaluates them and lastly computes a set of acceptable arguments from which con-
clusions are drawn.
The main result of the work presented in this paper is that the argumentation frame-
work captures the result of the merging operator deﬁned in [6,7,17] without merging the
diﬀerent bases. This is of great importance since merging the bases is computationally very
costly. Moreover, it is not always interesting to merge the bases as it is the case in a multi-
agent system. In such a system, each agent has its own base which may conﬂict with the
bases of the other agents.
Moreover the argumentation-based framework solves the drowning problem. Conse-
quently, it returns more formulas than the approach which merges the bases.
The present work can also be easily extended to recover a merging approach developed
in [23] to merge possibilistic bases using multiple-operators. In that work, two merging
operators are used for consistent and conﬂicting formulas respectively. To capture this
merging approach the force of an argument will be computed using two operators; an
operator applied on formulas provided by consistent bases and another operator applied
on formulas provided by conﬂicting bases.
An extension of this work would be to study the behavior of the argumentation-based
approach proposed in this paper from a postulate point of view inspired from the descrip-
tion of possibilistic merging operators from postulate point of view given in [8]. Another
extension consists in comparing the argumentation-based approach and the merging-
based approach from a complexity in space and time point of view.
Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 2
Let R ¼ fð/;	ða1; . . . ; anÞÞj/ 2L and Bi  ð/; aiÞg.
First note that (/,ai) is an existential inference of Bi means that the greatest weight with
which / may belong to Bi is ai.
Now note that / may be any formula Dj in B

	. We have ð/;	ðx1; . . . ; xnÞÞ 2 B	 while
(/, 	(a1, . . . ,an)) 2 R. Since  gives the greatest possible weight of a formula we have
aiP xi for i = 1, . . . ,n. Then 	(a1, . . . ,an)P 	(x1, . . . ,xn). We distinguish two cases:
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Case 2: 	(a1, . . . ,an) > 	(x1, . . . ,xn). This means that there exists at least ak s.t. ak > xk.
This also means that the formula in / (i.e. Dj) taken from Bk can belong to Bk
with the weight ak higher than xk. In this case we can add that formula to Bk with
the weight ak and we get a new possibilistic base equivalent to Bk following Def-
inition 5. Indeed (/, 	(a1, . . . ,an)) can be added to B	 without any damage.
When / is not a formula Dj we distinguish two cases:
• "i = 1, . . . ,n:Bi  (/,0).Then/belongs toRwith theweight	(0, . . . ,0) = 0 so it is ignored.
• $i, Bi  (/,ai) with ai5 0. This means that / does not belong to Bi but is a consequence
of some formulas of Bi. Following Deﬁnition 5 this formula can be added to Bi and
(/, 	(a1, . . . ,an)) can also be added to B	 without any damage.
So each formula in R either belongs to B	 or can be added without any damage and
conversely. Indeed B	 and R are equivalent. h
Proof of Proposition 2
Let B1, . . . ,Bn be n possibilistic bases.
Following Deﬁnition 8 we have B	 ¼ fðDj;	ðx1; . . . ; xnÞ j j ¼ 1; . . . ; ng, where Dj are
disjunctions of size j among formulas taken from diﬀerent Bi’s (i = 1, . . . ,n) and xi is either
equal to ai or to 0 depending respectively on whether /i belongs to Dj or not.
In order to show that B and B	 are equivalent for  = 	, we show that 8ð/; aÞ 2 B we
have ð/; aÞ 2 B	 and conversely.
Let (/1,a1) 2 B1, . . . , (/n,an) 2 Bn. Then (/1, (a1,0, . . . , 0)) 2 Conj, (/2, (0,a2,0, . . . ,
0)) 2 Conj, . . . , (/n, (0, . . . , 0,an)) 2 Conj.
Following Deﬁnition 8, /1 belongs to B	 with the weight 	(a1,0, . . . , 0). When  = 	,
it also belongs to B	. This implies as well to (/2, (0,a2,0, . . . , 0)), . . . , (/n, (0, . . . , 0,an)).
Indeed Conj  B	.
Now (/1 _ 
 
 
 _ /i, (a1, . . . ,ai, 0, . . . , 0)) 2 Disj. Following Deﬁnition 8, this formula
also belongs to B	 when  = 	. Indeed Disj  B	.
Similarly we show that each formula in B	 belongs also to B when  = 	. In fact Dj is
either composed of one formula and thus corresponds to a formula in Conj or composed
of more than one formula and thus corresponds to a formula in Disj. h
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof can be checked by noticing that the force of an argument corresponds to the
minimal weight of formulas in this argument following Deﬁnition 21. Following Lemma 2,
if a formula (/,a) belongs toB	 then a = 	(a1, . . . ,an) such that Bi  (/,ai) for i = 1, . . . ,n.
Since B ¼ B	 for  = 	 following Proposition 2, it holds that Force(A) = min{ 	(aj1, . . . ,
ajn)j/j 2 H, Bi  (/j,aji)}, where H is the support of A. h
Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that / is a plausible consequence of B and let us show that $A = hH,/i in S.
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Let R be a minimal subset of B>Inc(B) ‘ / s.t. R ‘ /. Then hR,/i is an argument in favor
of /. Moreover Force(R) > Inc(B) since R  B>Inc(B).
Notice B>Inc(B) is consistent so each argument R 0 undercutting R has some or all its
formulas above the inconsistency degree of B. Indeed Force(R 0) 6 Inc(B). Then
Force(R) > Force(R 0) i.e. R 	 R 0. Indeed hR,/i is an acceptable argument i.e. hR;/i 2
S. h
Proof of Proposition 5
Let (/,a) be a possibilistic consequence of B.
Let us ﬁrst show that there exists A ¼ hH ;/i 2S s.t. Force(A) = a. Following Deﬁni-
tion 7, (/,a) is a possibilistic consequence of B implies that / is a plausible consequence of
B. Following Proposition 4 this means that there exists hH ;/i 2S.
Also following Deﬁnition 7, a is the maximal weight with which / is inferred from B.
Since the arguments are by deﬁnition minimal, there is necessarily an argument hH,/i in
S s.t. the minimal weight of formulas of H in B is a, i.e. Force(A) = a.
Let us now show that 8A0 ¼ hH 0;/i 2 S we have A 	 A 0. Suppose that there exists
A0 ¼ hH 0;/i 2S s.t. A 	 A 0 i.e. Force(A) < Force(A 0).
Let a 0 = Force(A 0). This means that the minimal weight of formulas of H 0 in B is a 0. By
deﬁnition of the argument, we know that H 0 is minimal. Indeed / is a possibilistic conse-
quence of H 0 with a weight equal to a 0.
Since a > Inc(B) (following Deﬁnition 7) we have also a 0 > Inc(B). Indeed (/,a 0) is a
possibilistic consequence of B following Deﬁnition 7. However by hypothesis (/,a) is also
a possibilistic consequence of B and the fact that a 0 > a contradicts item 2 of Deﬁnition 7.
Indeed aP a 0 i.e. Force(A)P Force(A 0) which corresponds to A  	A 0. h
Proof of Proposition 6
The proof can be checked by ﬁrst noticing that arguments are individually consistent.
Let Ai = hH,/i and Aj = hH 0,wi s.t. Ai undercuts Aj. This means that $k 2 H 0 s.t. /  :k.
This also means that H [ H 0 is inconsistent.
Let Rij ¼ fð/l; alÞ : /l 2 H ; ð/l; alÞ 2 Bg [ fðwl0 ; al0 Þ : wl0 2 H 0; ðwl0 ; al0 Þ 2 Bg.
We have Inc(Rij)P min(Force(Ai),Force(Aj)). We distinguish two cases: either
Inc(Rij) = min(Force(Ai),Force(Aj)) or
Inc(Rij) > min(Force(Ai),Force(Aj)).
Suppose that Force(Ai)P Force(Aj).
The ﬁrst case means that the formula k 2 H 0 s.t. /  :k has the minimal weight in H 0.
The second case means that this formula has not the minimal weight in H 0 so Inc(Rij) >
Force(Aj). However this does not alter the computation of Inc(B) since Ai also undercuts
Am = hH00,ki, where /  :k. In this case we have Inc(R 0) = min(Force(Ai),Force(Am)),
where R 0* = H [ H00. Then we have Inc(R 0) > Inc(Rij). Now we know from Deﬁnition 4
that the inconsistency degree of B is the maximal degree in B where inconsistency is
met. Indeed we have well
IncðBÞ ¼ maxfminðForceðAiÞ;ForceðAjÞÞjAi;Aj 2AðBÞ and Ai Undercuts Ajg: 
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(1)
• Suppose that / is a plausible consequence of B and show that $A = hH,/i in
AðBÞ s.t. Force(A) > Inc(B).
From Deﬁnition 6, / is a plausible consequence of B iﬀ B>Inc(B) ‘ /. Indeed there
is a minimal set H in B>Inc(B) s.t. H ‘ /. So A = hH,/i is an argument in favor of
/. Since all formulas ofH are in B>Inc(B) we have that all formulas ofH in B have a
weight strictly greater than Inc(B). Indeed Force(A) > Inc(B).
• Suppose now that $A = hH,/i inAðBÞ s.t. Force(A) > Inc(B) and let us show that
/ is a plausible consequence of B.
hH,/i is an argument in favor of /means thatH ‘ /. Since Force(A) > Inc(B) this
means that H  B>Inc(B). Inference in propositional logic is monotonic so we have
B>Inc(B) ‘ /. Then / is a plausible consequence of B.(2) Suppose that (/,a) is a possibilistic consequence of B. From Proposition 5 we have
that $A = hH,/i in AðBÞ s.t. Force(A) = a.
From Deﬁnition 7 we have that if (/,a) is a possibilistic consequence of B then / is a
plausible consequence of B. Following the ﬁrst item of this proposition we have For-
ce(A) > Inc(B).From Deﬁnition 7, we know that there is no b > a s.t. B>b ‘ /. So
8A0 ¼ hH ;/i 2AðBÞ we have necessarily Force(A)P Force(A 0).
• Suppose that $A = hH,/i in AðBÞ s.t. Force(A) > Inc(B) and Force(A) = a. Fol-
lowing the ﬁrst item of this proposition this means that / is a plausible conse-
quence of B i.e. B>Inc(B) ‘ /.
Suppose now that "A 0 = hH 0,/i in AðBÞ s.t. Force(A) > Inc(B) we have For-
ce(A)P Force(A 0). This simply means that there is no b > Force(A) s.t. B>b ‘ /.
This corresponds to the second item of Deﬁnition 7. Indeed (/,a) is a possibilistic
consequence of B. hProof of Theorem 1
Suppose that  = 	. Following Proposition 2 we have B ¼ B	. Let us show that
8ð/; aÞ 2T we have / 2 SuppðSÞ.
/ 2 SuppðSÞ means that there exists an argument A = hH,wi in S such that / 2 H.
Notice ð/; aÞ 2Tmeans that / is a plausible consequence ofB	 so it is also a plausible
consequence of B i.e. B>IncðBÞ ‘ /. By deﬁnition B>IncðBÞ is consistent. Let R be a minimal
subset of B>IncðBÞ s.t. R ‘ /. So A = hR,/i is an argument in favor of /. Since B>IncðBÞ is
consistent then each argument A 0 undercutting A = hR,/i takes at least one formula from
B6IncðBÞ. So Force(A 0) < Force(A) which means that A is preferred to all its undercutting
arguments. Indeed A is an acceptable argument i.e. it belongs to S which implies that
/ 2 SuppðSÞ.References
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